The late-nineteenth century saw international mass migrations of capital and labor from the Old World to the New. Factors chased each other and the abundant resources at the frontier.
For some time now, economic historians have debated two questions: first, whether the "world" capital market was "well integrated"; and second, how much of the massive capital flows to the New World were pulled by an economic boom in the New World, and how much by an economic bust in Britain. This paper does not deal with the first question, although we note that the evidence certainly seems to confirm the well-integrated view. Indeed, the evidence suggests that world capital markets were at least as well integrated in the 1890s as they were in the 1980s and probably better (Zevin 1992) , and that they were probably well integrated as early as the 18th century (Neal 1985) . This paper assumes as much and focuses on the second question.
Having dual scarcity, the New World needed both capital and labor to exploit fully their abundant natural resources. The problem, however, was that any effort to increase New World labor supplies served to augment still further their capital requirements. And they certainly did increase their labor supplies relative to the Old World. Figure 1 reports the simple correlation between population growth rates (the rate of change of log N(t) on the vertical axis) and the initial real wages in 1870 (log W 0 (t) on the horizontal axis) for the period 1870-1913. Four New World countries are clustered to the right (Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the USA), the poorest Old World countries are clustered to the left (Italy, Sweden, Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark), while the remaining richer Old World countries are clustered in the middle (France, Ireland, Belgium, Germany and the UK). Labor scarcity produced the predictable labor supply response among these fifteen countries, and the correlation is strong (slope coefficient 0.011, t-statistic 2.75).
Fast population and labor force growth in the New World implied high investment rates to equip the new workers. This view has become conventional wisdom, so much so that we now have come to talk about the importance of booms in population-sensitive investment demand in pulling capital from the Old World to the New (Green and Urquhart 1976, Edelstein 1982, 198-208) . Not only were investment booms in the New World driven in large part by population and labor force growth, but they tended to be centered on social overhead activities which, being very capital intensive, tended to augment investment requirements even (Lewis 1978 , Williamson 1979 . Thus, labor force growth in the New World, responding to labor scarcity, raised capital scarcity, augmented investment requirements, and pulled in even more capital from the Old World. All of this is well known, although what rôle labor force growth played in accounting for the massive capital flows to the New World remains an open question.
Rapid population and labor force growth in the New World was achieved, of course, in two ways. First, the immigrants augmented labor supplies in the New World (while depleting them in the Old). In the USA, for example, immigrants accounted for 40.5 percent of the population increase between 1870 and 1913 (United States Bureau of the Census 1975, 1:8, 104-5) . Second, New World residents augmented the labor supply by high fertility and low infant mortality rates.
Such demographic forces had implications for labor participation and dependency rates (the share of the population dependent on adult workers), and it is the latter which is the focus of this paper.
According to the life-cycle model, economies full of very young households burdened with high dependency rates should save smaller shares of their income. The next section will elaborate on the argument and survey the relevant literature; we are certainly not the first to suggest that high dependency rates were likely to have choked off domestic savings rates in the New World full of younger generations, increasing their dependence on the Old World (full of older generations) to satisfy their investment requirements (Green and Urquhart 1976, 219) . But no one to our knowledge has taken a close look at the size of the dependency-rate gaps between Old World and New, and tried to assess the rôle that those gaps might have made in contributing to the massive capital transfer just prior to World War I.
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The paper poses the following counterfactual: what would New World domestic savings rates have been like prior to World War I had they been favored by the lower dependency rates then prevailing in Britain, the key capital exporter in the Old World? We then ask by how much foreign capital requirements in the New World would have declined, and, thus, how much of Britain's capital exports can be explained by demographic forces. The bottom line is this. It appears that dependency-rate gaps can account for a large share (roughly three-quarters) of late 19th century capital flows to the New World and, as a consequence, it is appropriate to view them as an intergenerational transfer.
II. Dependency-rate Gaps and the Life Cycle Model
First, we must establish whether there were dependency-rate gaps between the Old World and the New, and whether they were big enough to have mattered. For this discussion we take the Old World to be the United Kingdom, which, after all, was the main source of capital exports. The New World includes Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the USA, a group which accounted for the vast majority of the New World capital imports from the UK, and which includes those countries whose data base makes it possible to implement a quantitative assessment.
2 Figure 2 should suffice to motivate the discussion. Figure 2( (Figure 2(b) ). Between 1900 and 1913, they were still positive. Around 1900, the gap was 7.7
percentage points for Argentina, 2.7 for Australia, 2.0 for Canada, and 1.8 for the USA. 4 The issue now is whether these dependency-rate gaps were big enough to matter, and the answer hinges on their estimated impact on New World savings.
High dependency rates imply low savings rates. This follows directly from the dependency hypotheses, a centerpiece in the economic-demographic literature for about two decades following the appearance of Coale and Hoover's highly influential Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries (1958) . 5 The dependency hypothesis reached its apex in 1969
with Nathaniel Leff's (1969) paper which offered very strong empirical support based on a cross section of 74 countries. Across the 1970s, however, better data and more careful analysis yielded more ambiguous results, and it looked like the dependency hypothesis was about to be shelved as another plausible theory with no strong evidence to support it. In the 1980s, new life was breathed into the hypothesis by Andrew Mason (1981 , 1988 ), Maxwell Fry (1984 Lewis (1983) applied the life-cycle model to identify successfully the rôle of the American dependency rate decline between 1830 and 1900. Lewis approached the problem using child rearing costs implied by various household surveys from 1889-90, 1900 and 1935-36 . He then estimated that the decline in the dependency rate could have accounted for perhaps a quarter of the marked rise in the aggregate domestic savings rate, a rise of which so much has been made by American economic historians (Gallman 1966 , David 1977 , Williamson 1979 , Ransom and Sutch 1983 , and a rise which helped wean America away from foreign capital as the late 19th century unfolded. One of the present authors applied the same dependency-rate reasoning to help account for the higher savings rates in England's cities (compared with the countryside) during the Industrial Revolution. A lower dependency rate also raised city savings rates perhaps as much as 3 percentage points above those of the countryside, thus diminishing the rural-urban capital flows necessary to finance the urban-based industrial revolution (Williamson 1990, 34-39) .
The most recent application in economic history was offered by Ian McLean (1991) who successfully applied a simple version of the dependency rate hypothesis to Australian and Canadian experience from the 1860s to the present. McLean's research has stimulated our own, but we have extended it in three directions: Argentina has been added to the analysis; McLean's version of the dependency rate hypothesis has been replaced by one which draws on Mason and Leff; and, most importantly, the results are used to explore the underlying sources of those massive capital flows from Old World to New just prior to World War One.
III. Estimating the Impact of Dependency Rates on Domestic Savings
The demographic analysis of savings has been a common, if controversial, element of the empirical development literature since Leff's seminal work in the late sixties. Leff (1969) analyzed savings rates in a large cross-section sample, including both developed and less-developed countries, and found that high dependency rates had a significant negative impact on savings rates. The savings equations estimated by Leff typically took the form
where g denotes the rate of growth of real per capita income, Y/N the level of real income per capita, D 1 and D 2 the young (ages 0-15) and old (ages 65 and older) dependency rates, and s the aggregate savings rate. Leff's study generated much criticism based on its sample choice and omitted variables, and subsequent work revealed a great disparity in the magnitude and significance of the effect. In more recent efforts to explore the link between savings and dependency rates, panel data has been used to overcome such data restrictions. Mason (1987) exploited a three-period panel data set for a large group of post-World War Two countries, including the growth-rate interaction term in his savings functions. His typical regression takes the form
where c denotes the aggregate consumption share (net or gross) in income, g the rate of aggregate real income growth, D the young dependency rate (a proxy for the quantity of child-rearing activities), and a derived measure of the difference between mean ages of child-rearing and other activities.
The Mason model bears the stamp of Leff's pioneering approach, yet reflects the subtleties of a thorough micro-analysis of household saving and child-rearing decisions, as noted above.
Given the eclectic nature of the literature, a hybrid model has been used in this paper to incorporate both direct effects of the dependency rate on savings, in the manner of Leff and his critics, and indirect effects operating via the growth rate, following Mason. Although data limitations preclude a time-series analysis for most of today's less-developed countries, we were not similarly hampered when dealing with the New World economies, whose documented macroeconomic experience stretches back to the turn of the century and beyond. National saving can be calculated from investment and the current-account identity; and savings rates can then be derived using an estimate of national income. Time series for real national income provide estimates of growth rates, and frequent population censuses allow the calculation of dependency rates using interpolation as necessary. In this way a complete time-series database was built up for four New World economies, comprising national aggregate savings rates (s), young dependency rates (D), and growth rates of aggregate real income (g). 10 The following hybrid savings equation was estimated for Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States with dummy variables included to account for wartime effects:
The results are presented in somewhere within these bounds, as expected, but in all cases the elasticity estimates are large in the context of recent studies. For example, these figures are much larger on the whole than the estimates from contemporary international cross-section analysis reviewed by Hammer (1986, 584) .
Broadly speaking, the analysis of saving in these three New World economies offers strong support to the dependency hypothesis. The exception to this rule is the United States, the New World country which, based on previous microeconomic analysis, has the most supportive dependency-rate and life-cycle literature. Table 2 reports these unexpected findings: definitive support for the hypothesis that the changing United States age distribution has affected the macroeconomic aggregates has proven elusive.
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Of course, it is tempting to expect too much of the model. In the short to medium term, however, a dependency-rate theory of saving is clearly unable to track long-swing and Kuznets-Cycle phenomena. Such phenomena include the typical long-wave, boom-and-bust variations in macroeconomic aggregates so clearly evident over this period. The dependency-rate theory is much better suited to analysis over the medium to long term where such variations wash out: a sound motivation for the long time-series analysis pursued here.
14 On a more positive note, table 2 suggests that the impact of dependency rates in the other three New World countries was highly significant and large in comparison to contemporary estimates:
typically, a one percentage-point rise in the dependency rate led approximately to a one percentagepoint fall in the aggregate savings rate.
IV. Capital Flows to the New World as an Intergenerational Transfer
What is the counterfactual? infer the crowding-out of foreign capital that would ensue by exploiting the current account identity.
The method is essentially a means to measure how much "demographic crowding-out" would be entailed by eliminating the dependency-rate gaps between sending and receiving regions in the world capital market. The appropriate measure is (derivation in note):
This crowding-out may be expressed in terms of its impact either in the sending or receiving region. For any receiving region j (a country or a group of countries), we may calculate the share of demographic crowding-out in total world-wide British net foreign investment (NFI = Σ j NFI j ); or we may calculate the share of the demographic crowding-out in total British net foreign investment in that region alone (NFI j ):
share of total British NFI crowded out in country j = -∆NFI j Σ j NFI j ;
share of British NFI in country j crowded out in country j = -∆NFI j NFI j . Tables 3 and 4 . (Feinstein 1972 , Edelstein 1982 , appendix 1).
Counterfactual 1: How much of total British net foreign investment would have been crowded out in the three New World economies alone? (MIN estimate)
The levels of crowding-out suggest that demographic influences at their peak may have been responsible for pulling as much as 46% of total British capital exports to these three countries alone between 1901 and 1906; the figure was 28% for 1907-13. The impact was much smaller before 1891, not because dependency-rate gaps were smaller (they were larger), nor because elasticities were lower (they are assumed constant), but because national incomes and, thus, savings shortfalls in those three countries were modest in relation to total British capital-export potential. Thereafter, demographic crowding-out in the three New World economies always amounted to at least 25% of total British NFI. As a corollary to the above calculations, we now examine the impact of demographic crowdingout on foreign capital from the point of view of the six receiving New World countries. Table 3 (b) confirms that from a receiving region perspective the impacts were immense. With small dependency-rate gaps and large capital inflows (relative to the size of the economy), the Empire pair would have reduced their foreign capital dependence by 20%. In Latin America, the influence was an order of magnitude higher: larger dependency-rate gaps and smaller borrowing requirements offered a potential for massive crowding-out. All four Latin economies would have become selfsufficient in capital accumulation had they enjoyed the smaller counterfactual dependency burden.
On average 130% of British NFI would have been crowded out by augmented domestic savings in the six countries, our MAX estimate.
V. Conclusion
What prompted the huge capital export from Britain around the turn of the century? The scarcity of capital abroad, of course. But was this scarcity induced by a buoyant investment demand boom or by a savings shortfall at the periphery? In some sense, both mattered. Yet the above results appear to favor the latter as a key difference between capital markets in the Old and New Worlds, and indicate that a sizeable share of British overseas investment before World War One took the form of an intergenerational transfer. Consideration of a number of counterfactual alternatives has provided us with a range of estimates, including some plausible guesses about upper and lower bounds. Of course, the question still remains whether our estimates may in some way be biased, either due to flaws in the modelling or in the econometrics. We can think of two potential biases-but they operate in different directions.
On the one hand, since we estimate saving as investment plus the current account, our results may be biased if investment was correlated with the dependency rate and if the current account was a binding constraint. An obvious example is offered by the population-sensitive investment categories noted earlier. In this case, higher dependency rates would have been associated with augmented investment demand and diminished savings supply. If the New World economies were in any way savings constrained, these forces would have tended to offset each other, diminishing the measured dependency rate impact on aggregate saving. Such influences would tend to bias our estimate of the direct dependency-rate impact on saving towards zero, since we are trying to estimate the direct impact of D on s with I held fixed. If demographic forces crowded-in investment, then we have underestimated the influence of dependency rates on savings rates, and, hence, we have understated the potential for demographic crowding-out of foreign investment in our counterfactual.
On the other hand, by assuming a full pass-through of surplus savings into the current account, our analysis represents only a partial equilibrium approach. What would have been the impact of counterfactual increases in New World savings in the world capital market? Presumably, an excess supply of world capital would have lowered interest rates and, in general equilibrium, crowded-in investment and crowded-out saving in all countries. In general equilibrium, the demographic impact on savings would be muted compared to partial equilibrium: the counterfactually augmented world supply of savings would entail a price of capital adjustment that would have crowded out some of the rise in savings observed in the counterfactual. For example, if all supply and demand schedules in the capital market had elasticities of equal magnitude, our counterfactual estimates of demographic crowding-out would be reduced by half if we were to allow general-equilibrium to operate. By this line of reasoning, we may have an overestimate of the dependency-rate impact on savings, and an overstatement of the potential for demographic crowding-out of foreign investment.
Since we do not wish to oversell the accuracy or completeness of the analysis, some words of caution are in order. The paper does not present a theory nor offer any explanation of "Kuznets Cycles" or "long swings", the pronounced yet enigmatic long waves observable in macroeconomic aggregates in New World and Old, and most markedly evident in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The interested reader is directed to the resurgent literature on this topic (Solomou 1987, Rowthorn and Solomou 1991 Modigliani-Sterling (1983) formula. 14 We return to this point in our concluding remarks, but it suffices to say that those wishing to test the life-cycle or dependency-rate theories of saving with macroeconomic data face frustration. The use of multi-country cross-sections for short periods (or even a single year) raises the possibility of omitted variable bias, a typical criticism of Leff's original study. The use of long time series for a few countries (or only one country) raises the question of the structural stability of the savings equation and inclines the model to track poorly over the short to medium term. It may be that a panel of medium-length time series for groups of sufficiently similar countries offers the best compromise. For the U.S. at least, it will certainly require further research to reconcile the differences in the array of estimates arising from variations in the quality of the data, the length and scope of the time series and the sensitivity of the hypotheses to alternative model specifications. 15 Let D j denote the young dependency rate in country j, and ∆D j denote the dependency-rate gap in country j relative to Britain, written ∆D j = D j -D UK . The impact of changes in the dependency rate on savings rates for three New
World capital importers operate through the partial derivative D = ∂s/∂D. Let β ^ D j denote the parameter estimate for country j. The current account identity expresses the relation between national savings (S j ), investment (I j ) and net foreign investment (NFI j ) in each country: NFI j = I j -S j . Assuming invariant levels of domestic investment under counterfactual conditions, any increase in total domestic savings level spills over into a one-for-one decrease in the current account balance, crowding-out foreign investment: ∆NFI j = -∆S j . To estimate the change in total domestic savings due to "demographic crowding-out," we first observe that the counterfactual change in the savings rate is given
The implied change in the level of total domestic savings may be imputed using an estimate of country j' s national income Y j , and hence the implied spill-over into the balance of payments, and thus the net foreign investment crowded-out, is given by the formula in the text. 16 Paish classifies British investment by destination over the period 1907-13, and, despite recent revisions, his estimates are still considered robust (Platt 1986 , Feinstein 1990 . 17 We could just as easily have used the Argentine parameter estimate ( β ^ D ARG = -1.60) but that would have implied even larger effects. Maddison's (1989, 113) estimates of the real GDP rankings (in US$ of 1980) of these countries relative to the UK in 1913 and Mitchell's (1983) estimate of nominal national income in the UK. Dependency rates are also from Mitchell taking the nearest census and working out the dependency-rate gap relative to the UK in that year. See appendix for UK dependency rate sources. Census dates are: Brazil, 1920; Chile, 1907; Mexico, 1910. -23 - 
